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Splitting hairs?
Is it discrimination? James Marson & Katy Ferris examine 
the different approaches of the court to mistreatment 
on grounds of nationality & immigration status
The case of Taiwo v Olaigbe and another: Onu v Akwiwu and another [2016] UKSC 31, [2016] All ER (D) 134 (Jun) involved the 
mistreatment of migrant domestic workers 
by their employers and whether such 
action amounted to direct or indirect race 
discrimination. 
The question for the Supreme Court 
was whether the appellants suffered 
mistreatment on the basis of their 
nationality (which would be protected by s 
13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010)) 
or due to their vulnerable immigration 
status (which is not protected).
The facts
Ms Taiwo’s case 
Ms Taiwo, a Nigerian national, entered 
the UK in 2010 with a migrant worker’s 
visa obtained, falsely, by her employers Mr 
and Mrs Olaigbe. They achieved this on 
the basis of a “manufactured history” of 
previous employment between Ms Taiwo 
and the parents of Mr Olaigbe. Mr and 
Mrs Olaigbe had two children, and at the 
time were fostering a further two children. 
Ms Taiwo was engaged as a carer for the 
children. Olaigbe had fabricated a contract 
of employment for Ms Taiwo and, on her 
arrival in the UK, confiscated her passport.
Ms Taiwo’s responsibilities included being 
“on duty” most of her waking time with no 
rest periods (contrary to the Working Time 
Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/1833) (WTR 
1998)); she had not been paid the minimum 
wage; she was not provided with sufficient 
food—leading to dramatic weight loss; and 
she was subject to physical and mental abuse 
by Mr and Mrs Olaigbe and his mother. Ms 
Taiwo shared a bedroom with the children 
and was subject to conduct which the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal considered as 
“systematic and callous exploitation”.
In April 2011 Ms Taiwo succeeded in 
her claims against the employer under 
the National Minimum Wage Act 1998; 
s 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
(ERA 1996); WTR 1998 and for failure to 
provide a written statement of particulars 
as required under s 1 of the 1996 Act. 
Ms Taiwo also brought proceedings 
on the basis of direct and indirect race 
discrimination under EqA 2010 and the 
Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976). 
Ms Onu’s case
Ms Onu’s case was similar to that of Ms 
Taiwo. She too was a Nigerian national 
who entered the UK on a domestic worker’s 
visa obtained by her employers. Again, 
false information had been provided to 
the UK authorities in order to obtain the 
visa. Her contract of employment (to which 
Ms Onu never had access) was drafted in 
Nigeria and included clauses that she had 
to remain in their employ for a minimum of 
one year and if she broke this agreement, 
Ms Onu would be reported to the police 
and the immigration authorities. Ms Onu 
worked on average 84 hours per week 
caring for the employers’ children (one of 
whom required special care) and was not 
provided with statutorily required rest 
periods, annual leave, nor was she paid the 
minimum wage. Ms Onu was threatened 
and abused by her employer. Following 
her escape from the employer, Ms Onu 
brought proceedings on the same grounds 
as Ms Taiwo, adding harassment and 
victimisation under EqA 2010.
The employment tribunal upheld her 
claims. They found Ms Onu to have been 
constructively and unfairly dismissed 
and, significantly, to have been directly 
discriminated against and harassed on the 
grounds of race. The employers had treated 
her less favourably than they would have 
treated someone who was not a migrant 
worker. However, the EAT reversed the 
finding of discrimination on the basis of 
race, maintaining the employers’ treatment 
of Ms Onu was inherently based on her 
subordinate position. It further rejected 
a claim of indirect discrimination based 
on a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) 
of “the mistreatment of migrant domestic 
workers”. 
IN BRIEF
 f In Taiwo v Olaigbe and another: Onu v 
Akwiwu and another the Supreme Court had 
to decide whether the appellants suffered 
mistreatment on the basis of their nationality 
(protected by s 13(1) of the Equality Act 
2010 (EqA 2010)) or due to their vulnerable 
immigration status (not protected).
The issues
The Court of Appeal heard both appeals 
and determined, on the question of direct 
discrimination, two issues. The first, 
the grounds issue, was rejected as the 
employers had not published nor applied 
a discriminatory criterion. The second, 
the nationality issue, was also rejected as 
immigration status was not to be equated 
with “nationality” for the purpose of RRA 
1976 and EqA 2010. 
A further argument was presented on the 
basis of indirect discrimination. There was 
also no indirect discrimination present as 
the mistreatment of migrant workers was 
not a PCP. The employers’ actions were not 
what indirect discrimination was intended 
to address. This was not a neutral criterion 
that disproportionately disadvantaged some 
of those to whom it applied when compared 
with others.
Ms Taiwo was granted leave to appeal on 
the nationality issue and was joined in her 
appeal by Ms Onu.
The judgment
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals 
of both Ms Taiwo and Ms Onu as neither 
had been the victim of race discrimination. 
The abuse they suffered, although clearly 
wrong, was as a result of their vulnerability 
as a migrant worker rather than their 
nationality.
Reasoning
EqA 2010 provides, in s 13(1), that a person 
(A) discriminates against another (B) 
if, because of a protected characteristic, 
A treats B less favourably than A treats 
or would treat others. “Race” is one of 
eight protected characteristics covered 
by the Act and at s 9(1) race “includes (a) 
colour, (b) nationality, and (c) ethnic or 
national origins”. It was acknowledged by 
Lady Hale, providing the only substantive 
judgment, that the appellants had been 
treated disgracefully, and that this was on 
the basis of their vulnerable immigration 
status. Unlawful direct discrimination 
would have occurred had the conduct of 
the employers been “on racial grounds” 
(per RRA 1976) or “because of” race (per 
EqA 2010). However, neither RRA 1976 
or EqA 2010 include nationality in the 
definition of race.
Arguments were presented that 
immigration status is a function 
of nationality (para. 15) and is 
indissociable from it. On this basis, broad 
interpretations of nationality exist in Art 
14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“any ground such as...national 
or social origin...or other status”) and s 
28(4) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(a racial group means “a group of persons 
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defined by reference to race, colour, 
nationality (including citizenship) or 
ethnic or national origins”). 
However, these sources did not need to 
distinguish between immigration status 
and nationality discrimination and were 
not instructive in interpreting RRA 1976 
or EqA 2010. Parliament, when enacting 
the EqA 2010 and its predecessors, had 
the ability to include immigration status 
as a protected characteristic but chose 
not to (para 22). Also, while accepted 
that immigration status is a function of 
nationality in that non-British nationals 
(apart from Irish citizens) are subject to 
immigration control, there exist a wide 
variety of immigration statuses. Ms 
Taiwo and Ms Onu were both particularly 
vulnerable to the mistreatment they 
suffered as they entered the UK on 
domestic workers’ visas which were 
granted for one year, although renewable, 
and employees would need approval of 
the immigration authorities to change 
their employer while in the UK. Other 
vulnerabilities present included that the 
employees were engaged (and resided) 
in the UK without their family or other 
support networks; they were unfamiliar 
with UK culture and language; they 
worked long hours; they had little 
knowledge of their legal rights; they 
worked in private homes which are less 
easy to regulate; they were often paid 
informally; and they had no recourse 
to public funds (para 25). Despite these 
factors, there are many non-British 
nationals living and working in the UK 
who do not share this vulnerability. It was 
further acknowledged that UK nationals 
working in the employers’ homes would 
not have been so badly treated, nor would 
they have treated non-British nationals 
who had the right to live and work in the 
UK in this way (para 26).
The case did not involve indirect 
discrimination (para 31), either under 
EqA 2010 or RRA 1976. There was no PCP 
as required under s 19 of EqA 2010, but 
the Supreme Court maintained that this 
did not prevent the possibility of indirect 
discrimination occurring in other cases 
involving the exploitation of migrant 
workers (para 33).
Commentary
Nationality
The term “nationality” is based on a person 
being a national of a particular country 
or can also involve their non-nationality 
(non-UK national etc) and constitutes a 
significant aspect of their identity. Further, 
his or her identity will likely include 
more than one aspect of “race” such as 
their colour, their national and/or ethnic 
origins, and may, for the purposes of the 
appellants to the current cases, include their 
immigration status. Therefore migrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers (for example) 
possess multiple identities and are largely 
protected against being discriminated 
against, being harassed or victimised, by 
equality laws—on the basis of their age, 
sex, sexual orientation, disability, religion 
or belief and so on. It is also true that for 
many migrants, their nationality (their 
particular nationality and the fact that they 
may be considered as a “foreigner”—a non-
national) constitutes a significant aspect 
of their negative experience. They may be 
particularly vulnerable to discrimination, 
harassment and prejudice experiences while 
in the UK. 
Particular vulnerabilities of migrant 
workers 
Migrant workers are likely to suffer 
disadvantages which are unique to their 
status and to those (non-migrants) who 
share a common protected characteristic 
other than their race. They are less likely 
in many instances to have the support 
networks and family members on whom to 
rely for comfort and help. They will lack the 
group membership for their social identity; 
they will have a lack of knowledge of how 
“things work” or from whom reliable, 
accurate help and guidance may be sourced. 
This will likely engender a fear and specific 
vulnerability which can be exploited by 
unscrupulous employers—confiscating 
passports, informing migrant workers of 
(incorrect) possible state punishment for 
any infraction of employment rules, and 
making their continued residence in the UK 
conditional on approval by the employer 
establishes an environment prime for abuse.
Way forward?
Dismissing the migrant workers’ appeals 
that they were discriminated on the 
basis of their race, the Supreme Court 
held their mistreatment had nothing to 
do with nationality. It was due to the 
women’s vulnerability arising from their 
immigration status (and their visas which 
made them dependent on their employers 
for continued residence in the UK) and 
this was not a protected characteristic in 
EqA 2010. Nor was immigration status to 
be interpreted as “race” for the purposes 
of the Act. It was acknowledged that the 
law cannot redress all the forms of harm 
that people suffer, but Lady Hale did 
question whether the remedy provided 
in s 8 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
was too restrictive in scope and whether 
employment tribunals should be granted 
powers to offer a remedy for workers 
mistreated in the manner suffered by the 
appellants. Parliament could have included 
immigration status as a specific protected 
characteristic, but chose not to.  NLJ
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